August 17, 2026

Sinochem to Expand HDI Capacity

Sinochem International increases investment in the HDI sector, with planned domestic capacity exceeding 500,000 tons.

2026-08-17 09:15:33Source:ChemNet中文

Recently, the Department of Ecology and Environment of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region accepted and publicized the environmental impact report for the 100,000 tons/year HDI and 180,000 tons/year Phosgene Expansion and Renovation Project (Phase I) and the 13,000 tons/year Chlorinated Ester Expansion Project of Ningxia Ruitai Technology Co., Ltd.

The project is planned and constructed as a whole to include 100,000 tons/year HDI, 100,000 tons/year HDI trimer, and 180,000 tons/year phosgene, with a co-production of 290,000 tons/year 30% hydrochloric acid; the project is implemented in three phases. The current phase promotes Phase I, involving the construction of a new 20,000 tons/year phosgene unit. Upon completion, the company’s total phosgene capacity will increase from the existing 30,000 tons/year to 50,000 tons/year.

Project Background: Filling the Phosgene Capacity Gap and Supporting Downstream High-end Products

Ningxia Ruitai Technology is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Jiangsu Yangnong Chemical, a subsidiary of Sinochem International. Established in 2010, the company currently possesses multiple production units including phosgene series products and nylon 66. The existing chlorinated ester capacity is 8,000 tons/year, and the products are supplied externally for the production of EHP and TBEC raw materials.

There are two major practical drivers for this expansion and renovation. On one hand, the company’s existing 30,000 tons/year phosgene capacity can hardly meet the full-load operation of downstream units. As a core intermediate for polyurethane and polycarbonate, phosgene capacity has become a bottleneck restricting the company’s development. On the other hand, this expansion simultaneously supports chlorinated ester capacity. After the project lands, the chlorinated ester capacity will increase from 8,000 tons/year to 13,000 tons/year. Meanwhile, new catalytic desulfurization facilities will be added to optimize the quality of phosgene products, laying a solid raw material foundation for the subsequent production of high-end HDI products.

HDI: High-end Aliphatic Isocyanate, Key Raw Material for New Energy Coatings

HDI, or hexamethylene diisocyanate, belongs to high-end aliphatic isocyanates. It differs significantly from aromatic isocyanates like MDI and TDI. Its molecules contain no benzene rings and feature a saturated aliphatic chain structure. It possesses outstanding characteristics such as yellowing resistance, weather resistance, corrosion resistance, and high light transmission. It is an indispensable curing agent raw material for high-end polyurethane coatings and adhesives. The phosgene method is also the current mainstream production process for high-performance HDI.

HDI is mostly used in scenarios with long-term outdoor exposure and stringent requirements for aging resistance, including automotive OEM topcoats, architectural exterior wall coatings, industrial heavy-duty anti-corrosion paints, high-end wood varnishes, and yacht protective coatings. It can effectively solve industry pain points such as easy yellowing, fast aging, and short service life of traditional coatings.

For a long time in the past, the global HDI market was monopolized by overseas enterprises. Foreign companies like Covestro and BASF dominated market supply, while domestic supply of high-end products was insufficient, leading to a high dependence on imports. However, in recent years, Asia has become the core region for global HDI capacity expansion, and domestic chemical enterprises have accelerated their layout in the HDI track, speeding up the import substitution process.

Industry Expansion Wave: Multiple Chemical Giants Enter the Market, Planned Capacity Under Construction Exceeds 500,000 Tons

Regarding overseas manufacturers:

· Covestro completed the acquisition of Converge’s HDI derivative base in July 2026, with existing HDI capacity of 190,000 tons/year;

· Nippon Polyurethane (NPU) has existing capacity of 15,000 tons/year and plans to expand by 50%, with new capacity expected to come on stream around August 2026;

· Asahi Kasei has existing capacity of 22,000 tons/year.

Domestic enterprises are accelerating to seize the market:

· Wanhua Chemical has a total existing HDI capacity of 209,000 tons after acquiring Converge assets. Combined with the Ningbo technical renovation project, the long-term total capacity will expand to 309,000 tons/year;

· Meirui New Materials has formed 100,000 tons/year HDI monomer and derivative capacity in its Henan Industrial Park, with another 200,000 tons under construction;

· NHU (Zhejiang Medicine) plans 103,000 tons/year HDI in its Weifang, Shandong project;

· Oriental Shenghong‘s subsidiary Lianyungang Hongke New Materials is investing 13.33 billion yuan to build an industrial chain project, laying out 50,000 tons/year HDI, simultaneously supporting TDI, PC, and BPA units, to create an integrated “Refining-Aromatics-BPA-PC/TDI/HDI” industrial chain.

According to industry statistics, the total planned HDI capacity awaiting production in the domestic stage has already exceeded 500,000 tons. In the future, the domestic self-sufficiency capability of HDI will be significantly improved, and the industry competitive landscape will usher in a reshaping.

Downstream Demand Explodes at Multiple Points, New Energy Field Opens Incremental Space

In addition to the traditional coatings market, the application of HDI in emerging industries is expanding rapidly, with continuous demand growth in areas such as electrophoretic paints, ultra-wear-resistant floor paints, wind power blade and tower protection coatings, and photovoltaic backsheet structural adhesives.

· Automotive Industry, BMW i-series electric vehicle OEM varnishes use an HDI curing agent system, with a weather resistance life of over 10 years, a 50% increase compared to traditional coatings;

· Wind Power Field, Huntsman’s WindCoat™3025 coating containing HDI trimer is applied to blades in a 60MW domestic offshore wind farm, with salt spray resistance breaking through 3,000 hours;

· Photovoltaic Industry, HDI-based materials are used in N-type modules with a light transmittance of up to 99.3%, a 2 percentage point increase compared to traditional EVA encapsulant films. With the continuous development of new energy vehicles, offshore wind power, and the photovoltaic industry, HDI’s long-term demand has strong support.

https://news.chemnet.com/news-8765.html

July 20, 2026

Chinese TDI Market

Brief Analysis of China’s TDI Imports and Exports in H1 2026

July 20, 2026 1 min read

In the first half of 2026, China’s TDI exports maintained rapid growth, reaching approximately 332,100 tonnes, up 24.2% year on year. Imports totaled around 2,180 tonnes, an increase of 144.9% year on year. Overall, China’s TDI trade remained heavily export-oriented, with imports accounting for only a small share. Export volume was approximately 152 times the import volume.

1. TDI Imports

Unit: tonnes

China imported approximately 310 tonnes of TDI in June, up 588.9% month on month and 113.8% year on year. The increase was mainly attributable to shipments from Japan, Saudi Arabia and Germany. Japan was the largest overseas source during the month, supplying 150 tonnes.

From January to June 2026, China imported approximately 2,180 tonnes of TDI, up 144.9% from 890 tonnes in the same period of 2025. However, around 750 tonnes were recorded with China as the trading partner, which may have involved re-imports, bonded-zone transfers or returned shipments. Therefore, imports originating from overseas suppliers were lower than the headline figure.

2. TDI Exports

Unit: tonnes

China exported approximately 56,600 tonnes of TDI in June, up 22.5% month on month and 17.7% year on year. Brazil remained the largest export destination, receiving around 7,111 tonnes, followed by Belgium, India, Vietnam and Türkiye.

From January to June 2026, China’s TDI exports totaled approximately 332,100 tonnes, an increase of about 64,800 tonnes from 267,300 tonnes in the same period of 2025, representing year-on-year growth of 24.2%. Brazil ranked first with around 29,600 tonnes, followed by Vietnam, Belgium, India and Indonesia. The top ten markets accounted for approximately 54.7% of total exports, while all other markets represented 45.3%, indicating a relatively diversified export destination mix.

https://www.pudaily.com/news/65812/brief-analysis-of-chinas-tdi-imports-and-exports-in-h1-2026

July 8, 2026

PU Raw Material ADD Analysis

Anti-Dumping on Polyurethane: How Trade Defense Is Repricing China’s PU Export Model

July 1, 2026 19 min read

MARKET INTELLIGENCE

Three separate forces are pressing on the same point of the global polyurethane chain this year, and they are easy to read as unrelated headlines rather than one story. A wave of anti-dumping duties across the United States, Europe, India, and Brazil is raising the cost of Chinese PU-chain exports at destination. China’s own decision to cancel export VAT rebates on polyether polyols is raising the cost of leaving China in the first place. And a five-month war in the Persian Gulf pushed feedstock costs into a spike that is only now unwinding. None of the three is new information individually. Read together, they describe the end of a specific economic model, export-led Chinese PU oversupply sold at a persistent discount, rather than a cluster of coincidental trade disputes.

One Cause, Two Reactions

It is worth being precise about what is actually driving this, because the anti-dumping wave and Beijing’s own rebate cancellation are frequently discussed as opposing developments, foreign protectionism versus Chinese liberalization,  when they are better understood as two reactions to the same underlying condition: sustained Chinese overcapacity in polyether polyols, MDI, TDI, and their shared upstream inputs. Chinese polyether polyol exports grew from roughly 1.7 million tonnes in 2023 to 2.8 million tonnes in 2025, a pace of growth that outstripped demand growth in every importing market and kept margins compressed across the value chain, including inside China itself. Producers in the US, EU, India, and Brazil responded to that oversupply the way trade law allows them to: by petitioning their own governments for relief. Beijing is responding to the same oversupply the way domestic industrial policy allows it to: by removing a subsidy that no longer serves its own producers’ interests either. The VAT rebate cancellation is frequently framed as a response to foreign pressure, but the stated rationale, curbing what Chinese policymakers call ‘involution,’ the deflationary price competition eating into every producer’s margin, points to a domestic motive that happens to align with what foreign trade-defense authorities want. That alignment is precisely what makes 2026 different from previous rounds of anti-dumping activity: the exporting country and the importing countries are, for once, pulling in the same direction, even if for different reasons.

A Decade in Context: Is This Actually Unusual?

TRADE REMEDY ACTIVITY AGAINST CHINA, 2015–2026

It is worth testing the claim above against the historical record, because trade remedies against China are not new, they have been a persistent feature of the trading system since China’s 2001 WTO accession, and it would be a mistake to read every new filing as evidence of an unprecedented crackdown. Chinese government data compiled through the Ministry of Commerce’s own Trade Remedy Information Center shows the total number of new investigations opened against Chinese products by all countries fluctuating between roughly 46 and 131 a year over the past decade, with most years landing in a 70–105 range. Looked at that way, the current wave is a continuation of a long-running pattern, not a departure from it.

What has changed is the shape of the curve, not just its existence. 2023 was a relatively quiet year at 69 new cases; 2024 more than doubled that to a record 160, with the number of countries filing cases rising from 18 to 28 in a single year as smaller and developing economies: Thailand, Peru, Pakistan among them, joined the traditional heavy users (India, the US, the EU). Steel offers a sharper illustrative comparison at the sector level: China faced roughly 29 major steel trade cases in the thirteen months from January 2024 to February 2025, against 15 across the entire four-year span from 2020 to 2023. That is not incremental growth; it is a step change in pace, concentrated in exactly the overcapacity-heavy sectors, steel, batteries, solar, and increasingly chemicals, where China’s own domestic price data shows the deepest and most sustained margin compression.

Year	Cases	Context
2020	131	Prior high point, Covid-era disruption
2022	46	Cyclical low
2023	69	18 trading partners filed cases
2024	160	Record high — more than double 2023; 28 trading partners, incl. Thailand, Peru, Pakistan

Two further data points frame where polyurethane sits within this broader picture. Over the longer run, 1995 to 2023, a cumulative 1,614 anti-dumping cases have been brought against China worldwide, with India (298 cases), the United States (189), and the European Union (155) as the three heaviest historical users; the current polyol, MDI, TDI, PTMEG, and adipic acid cases sit inside exactly that same top-three roster rather than representing new entrants to the practice. And within China’s own chemical sector specifically, industry commentary describes three consecutive years of profit decline and a roughly 36% fall in the sector’s product price index through late 2025, with local analysts explicitly warning that 2026 would bring more trade friction rather than less — a warning that the polyether polyols, PTMEG, and adipic acid filings of the past six months have already borne out. The honest reading, then, is not that anti-dumping activity against China is a new phenomenon in 2026, but that the specific chemicals underpinning polyurethane have moved, within the space of about eighteen months, from being a secondary target to one of the more active fronts inside a genuinely record year for the practice overall.

North America: A Case Study in Speed

UNITED STATES

The US MDI case is a useful marker for how quickly these proceedings can now move once a government decides to prioritize them. Petitioned in February 2025 by BASF and Dow under an ad hoc fair-trade coalition, the case produced preliminary margins as high as 511.75% within seven months and a finalized, enforceable antidumping duty order by June 25, 2026, roughly sixteen months from filing to order, which is fast by the standards of the statutory process. The final rate settled closer to 161.6% for cooperating respondents after correction of a ministerial error, still high enough to functionally exclude Chinese MDI from meaningful price competition in the US market for the foreseeable future.

The PTMEG case opened in April 2026 is worth reading differently. By naming South Korea and Vietnam alongside China, among other Asian producers, the petitioners are implicitly arguing that the problem is regional oversupply in the isocyanate and glycol chain, not a China-specific pricing practice. That framing matters for how Chinese producers should think about strategy: shifting nominal production or blending to a third Asian country will not obviously solve the underlying exposure if the US treats the whole region as a single competitive threat. The case is still in its early stage: the ITC’s May 2026 injury vote came back affirmative, which keeps the investigation alive, but that only clears the lower bar of ‘reasonable indication of injury.’ The number that will actually set duty levels, Commerce’s preliminary dumping margin, isn’t due until September 16, 2026, so there’s no PTMEG duty rate to point to yet, only a case that has survived its first procedural checkpoint.

Europe: The Producer Coalition Strategy

EUROPEAN UNION

The European cases show a related pattern, fewer but larger producers acting collectively rather than a single national champion filing alone, as in the Brazilian and US cases. The polyether polyols investigation opened in late June 2026 was brought jointly by BASF, Covestro, PCC Rokita, Shell, and Chimcomplex, effectively the entire surviving EU polyol producer base filing as one bloc. The adipic acid case that concluded in May 2026 with duties of 29.1% to 42.3% followed the same collective logic, built around a Chinese sector that now controls close to 70% of global adipic acid capacity. Two further filings on PBAT and aliphatic-aromatic copolyesters, adjacent biodegradable-plastics chains rather than core PU inputs, were both triggered by BASF, which is emerging as the most consistently active single petitioner across the entire European chemicals trade-defense docket this year, not just in polyurethane.

The complication is capacity. Ineos has publicly warned that the European Commission’s trade-defense caseload has grown faster than its staff can process it, citing injury findings as high as 67% met with duties proposed as low as 3.7% in unrelated cases. If that capacity constraint holds for polyurethane cases as it apparently has elsewhere, the polyether polyols investigation opened in June could take considerably longer to reach a preliminary determination than the statutory timeline suggests, leaving Chinese exporters operating under investigation-related uncertainty for an extended period without yet facing an actual duty.

India: What Sunset Reviews Reveal

INDIA

India offers the longest running dataset on how these measures actually perform over time, and the pattern is instructive. TDI duties against China, Japan, and Korea have been in force in some form since 2016 and were reaffirmed through a sunset review in 2022, suggesting a durable, structural competitive disadvantage that Chinese TDI has not been able to close even after several years of trying. Spandex tells a different story. An earlier elastomeric filament yarn duty regime lapsed in 2022, and Chinese and Vietnamese pricing pressure returned quickly enough that Indorama filed a fresh petition, resulting in a March 2026 recommendation for duties of roughly US$2 per kilogram. The lesson for how to read any of the current cases: a five-year duty is not necessarily a permanent solution, and the underlying Chinese cost advantage tends to reassert itself the moment protection lapses, which is exactly the dynamic worth watching as the US, EU, and Brazilian measures approach their own review dates later this decade.

India has also been the most active jurisdiction anywhere in actually completing new PU-chain cases rather than leaving them in process. A polyether polyol case opened in March 2023 by Manali Petrochemicals, India’s sole domestic producer, concluded within a year with duties of $534 per tonne on Wanhua and $608 per tonne on other Chinese producers — finalized a full year before Brazil’s comparable polyol case and more than two years ahead of the EU’s, which only opened in June 2026. A separate case brought by Covestro’s Indian unit against thermoplastic polyurethane (TPU) followed the same fast timeline, running from initiation in September 2023 to a finalized duty of $0.93–$1.58 per kilogram by October 2024. Taken together with TDI and the spandex cases, India has now run five distinct PU-chain proceedings against China since 2016, more than any other jurisdiction in this survey, and its average time from initiation to final duty, roughly twelve to fourteen months, is also the fastest of the major users covered here.

Brazil: The Limits of Protection, Seen From Inside

BRAZIL

Brazil is the clearest illustration of the tension these measures create even where they succeed. GECEX Resolution No. 754, in force since July 2025, set Chinese polyether polyol duties at roughly double the rate applied to US exporters, US$1,409–1,469 per tonne against Chinese producers including Wanhua and Hebei Yadong, versus US$555–680 per tonne against BASF and Dow. Dow Brasil Sudeste, the sole domestic petitioner, got the protection it asked for, and the size of the gap between the China and US rates points to exactly the outcome the duty was designed to produce: Chinese-origin volume is understood to have been the more heavily displaced of the two since July 2025, with import volumes from China running below their pre-duty levels. Brazil’s customs data broken out by origin was not available for this report, so that direction is best read as the expected and, on the evidence assembled during the case, the intended result rather than a precisely quantified figure.

Brazil’s foam and mattress manufacturers, represented by ABICOL, pushed back hard enough that SECEX opened a formal public-interest review within two weeks of the duties taking effect, specifically to assess whether they should be suspended given supply-shortage risk. That review has since concluded: GECEX Resolution No. 858, published February 20, 2026, closed the assessment without suspending or modifying the duty, after Dow argued that supply from non-Chinese origins combined with domestic capacity was sufficient to cover Brazilian demand. The measure stands as originally set, in force to 2030. The episode is still a useful reminder that anti-dumping relief redistributes cost within the importing country as much as it restricts the exporting one;  the domestic producer won twice, first on the original case and again on the review; though this particular review resolved in the petitioner’s favor rather than staying open-ended.

Brazil’s parallel adipic acid sunset review, opened March 30, 2026, adds a second layer: Brazil is simultaneously defending one wall on polyols, now upheld in full, and deciding whether to extend a second one on an adjacent PU input.

Southeast Asia: Exposure Without a Mechanism

INDONESIA, VIETNAM, MALAYSIA, THAILAND

No Southeast Asian authority currently runs a direct anti-dumping case against Chinese MDI, TDI, or polyether polyols. Indonesia’s KADI has been active on adjacent petrochemicals — polypropylene homopolymer and block copolymer — but those cases target multiple Asian exporters collectively rather than China specifically, a materially different posture from the China-focused cases in the US, EU, and India. What Southeast Asia does have is exposure: Vietnam sourced roughly 70% of its polyether polyol imports from China in 2025, a concentration that makes it a natural landing zone for volume that Chinese producers can no longer place competitively in the US, EU, India, or Brazil. Indonesia’s move to draft anti-circumvention and transshipment rules for 2026 suggests regulators are alert to the risk of Chinese material being rerouted through the region to dodge duties elsewhere, which, if finalized, would close off the release valve that currently makes Southeast Asia the most open market left for Chinese PU exports.

China’s Own Lever

CHINA DOMESTIC POLICY

On January 8–9, 2026, China’s Ministry of Finance and State Taxation Administration cancelled the 13% VAT export rebate on 249 product categories effective April 1, 2026, with polyether polyols under HS code 39072990 explicitly included alongside PVC, agrochemicals, and photovoltaic and battery inputs. With export dependency near 33% of Chinese polyol production, the removal of the rebate strips out a cost advantage that has underpinned Chinese pricing dominance in Turkey, India, and Vietnam for years. Some larger, vertically integrated producers are exploring a bonded processing-trade workaround — importing propylene oxide under a duty-free handbook scheme, converting it domestically, and re-exporting the finished polyol without triggering VAT — but the model only pencils out while imported PO undercuts domestic PO, a narrowing window as global feedstock markets normalize.

A Price Reality Check: What the Hormuz Shock Actually Did

FEEDSTOCK VOLATILITY, MARCH–JULY 2026

Two of the developments above happened to land in the same six-week window as an unrelated geopolitical shock, and separating the two matters for reading current spot prices correctly. The 2026 Iran war began February 28, and Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed on March 4, disrupting roughly a fifth of global seaborne oil and LNG trade and pushing Brent crude above $120 per barrel by mid-March. Because propylene oxide, the direct feedstock for polyether polyols, is an oil derivative, the war shock landed on Chinese FOB polyol pricing at almost exactly the same moment Chinese exporters were also rushing shipments to beat the April 1 VAT rebate deadline, two separate cost-and-volume pressures compounding into a single, unusually sharp spike.

The scale of the move, and the shape of its unwind, is worth stating plainly rather than folding into the trade-policy narrative above. Chinese FOB polyol pricing rose from roughly $1,225 per tonne on March 1 to a peak of $2,265 on April 8, an 85% move in five weeks, before falling back to around $1,340 per tonne by July 1, a 41% retracement from the peak that leaves China only about 9% above its pre-crisis baseline. European and North American delivered prices moved on a longer lag and have not unwound nearly as far: West European polyol peaked in early May near €2,575 per tonne and North American polyol peaked in late May near $3,142 per tonne, and both remain roughly 13% below those peaks as of July 1,  still close to double their March 1 starting points. That divergence is itself informative: Chinese pricing, driven by FOB spot competition and no longer cushioned by an export subsidy, snapped back quickly once the war de-escalated and the pre-deadline rush ended, while Western delivered prices, which layer freight, war-risk insurance, and in several cases anti-dumping duties on top of the same feedstock cost, are proving considerably stickier on the way down.

Weekly average spot prices, China (FOB), West Europe and North America (DEL). Source: PUdaily market pricing data.

Market	Mar 1 baseline	2026 peak	Jul 1, 2026
China, FOB (USD/t)	$1,225	$2,265  (Apr 8)	$1,340  (–41%)
West Europe, DEL (EUR/t)	€1,122	€2,575  (May 8)	€2,250  (−13%)
North America, DEL (USD/t)	$1,582	$3,142  (May 27)	$2,745  (−13%)

The practical implication for anyone reading a Chinese FOB quote today: the current price reflects a market that has already round-tripped through both a war shock and a subsidy withdrawal and landed close to where it started. It is not yet clear whether $1,300–$1,400 per tonne represents a new, post-rebate equilibrium or a temporary trough before Chinese producers pass through the lost 13% rebate more fully once feedstock volatility settles further.

Global Snapshot

Region	Product	Status	Key figure
United States	MDI	AD order in force — Jun 2026	~161.6% final rate
United States	PTMEG	ITC injury vote affirmative — May 2026	China, Korea, Vietnam named; dumping margin due Sep 2026
European Union	Adipic acid	Definitive duties — May 2026	29.1% – 42.3%
European Union	Polyether polyols	Investigation opened — Jun 2026	BASF, Covestro, PCC Rokita, Shell, Chimcomplex
European Union	PBAT / copolyesters	Investigations opening	BASF-led complaints, adjacent chain
India	TDI	In force — renewed 2022	China, Japan, Korea
India	Polyether polyols	In force — Mar 2024	$534–$608/t
India	TPU	In force — Oct 2024	$0.93–$1.58/kg
India	Spandex / elastane	Recommended — Mar 2026	Up to ~$2/kg; China + Vietnam
Brazil	Polyether polyols	In force — Jul 2025	$1,409–$1,469/t (vs $555–$680/t US)
Brazil	Adipic acid	Sunset review — Mar 2026	Extension under review
Southeast Asia	PU raw materials	No direct AD action	Vietnam ~70% China-origin polyol
China (domestic)	Polyether polyols + 248 others	VAT rebate cut — Apr 2026	13% rebate removed, HS 39072990

What Comes Next for Chinese Product

None of this points toward a collapse in Chinese PU export volumes, and it is worth resisting the temptation to read the case log above as a story of China losing ground. China’s capacity base remains large and cost-competitive at the feedstock level, and the obvious response to a duty, redirecting volume toward markets that haven’t imposed one, is exactly what trade theory predicts and what Chinese exporters have done in every prior round of this cycle. The more interesting question is not whether that redirection happens, but what else is happening at the same time: Chinese polyol, MDI, and TDI quality has continued to improve over the past several years, with leading producers such as Wanhua and Covestro’s China operations investing in higher-specification grades and moving up the value chain rather than competing on price alone. That matters because it means the current wave of duties raises the cost of entry for Chinese material without necessarily closing the quality gap that used to be the main argument against it, a materially different situation from a decade ago, when Chinese product competed almost purely on price.

With that caveat in mind, a few specific developments look likely over the next twelve to twenty-four months:

• Continued trade-flow redirection toward markets without duties. Chinese volume that previously went to the US, EU core markets, India, and Brazil will keep concentrating in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, reinforcing the import-dependence numbers already visible in Vietnam, Turkey, and India. This is the default response to any duty and shouldn’t be read as a special insight so much as the baseline case.
• Gradual uptake of bonded processing-trade structures. The import-PO, export-polyol workaround may spread beyond the largest integrated producers as the VAT rebate loss bites, though its economics remain fragile and sensitive to the domestic-versus-imported PO price spread, so this is likely to stay a partial, producer-specific response rather than a wholesale shift.
• More anti-circumvention scrutiny over time. Indonesia’s 2026 rulemaking may be followed by similar moves elsewhere as regulators in duty-free markets watch import volumes rise and ask whether material is genuinely originating where it claims to.
• Some consolidation pressure inside China, concentrated among smaller producers. Non-integrated Chinese polyol producers without secure feedstock access face the most margin pressure from the combined effect of the rebate loss and continued anti-involution policy; some capacity rationalization there is plausible, though the pace will depend on how much support local governments continue to extend to marginal producers.
• More overseas capacity investment by the largest Chinese producers, continuing an existing trend. Wanhua’s Hungary MDI capacity is the clearest precedent: producing inside a market that would otherwise impose a duty sidesteps the issue rather than contesting it, and further announcements of this kind would be consistent with treating the current measures as durable rather than temporary, though this is an extension of a strategy already underway, not a new one.
• A gradually widening product list, following an established pattern. TDI, PTMEG, and adipic acid cases are already open in multiple jurisdictions; adjacent chains such as PBAT are following the same petition pattern, and further filings covering additional PU-adjacent HS codes are a reasonable base-rate expectation rather than a dramatic escalation.

The honest summary: Chinese producers are not losing their structural cost advantage in feedstock and scale, and the quality gap that once made Western and Indian material an easy default choice has narrowed. What has changed is that the advantage now has to clear a materially higher bar,  duties in force or pending across four continents, a lost export subsidy at home — before it shows up as a landed price advantage for the buyer. That is a slower, costlier, and more contested version of the same trade, not the end of it, and not a story with an obvious winner.

Appendix: Full Case Log (2003–2026) — Anti-Dumping Actions Against Chinese PU-Chain Products

The list below covers documented anti-dumping investigations specifically targeting Chinese polyurethane-chain products — MDI, TDI, PTMEG, adipic acid, polyether polyols, TPU, spandex/elastane, and PU-coated leather — across the jurisdictions most active in this space. It reaches back to the earliest confirmed case, India’s original 2003 polyether polyol investigation, to show that PU-specific trade defense against China is not purely a product of the last decade, even though the current wave is far denser than anything in the prior twenty years. The log excludes adjacent chemicals (PBAT, copolyesters, general petrochemicals) and countries where no PU-specific case could be confirmed in available public sources, including Southeast Asia, where, as discussed above, no direct case against Chinese PU raw materials currently exists. Dates reflect investigation initiation, final determination, and duty notification where applicable; “Ongoing” indicates no final determination as of this writing.

Jurisdiction	Product	Started	Outcome
India	Polyether polyol (China, South Korea) — original case	2003	Final Nov 2004; sunset renewal 2009 (min. price $2,601/t); 2nd sunset review withdrew measure — lapsed 2015
India	TDI (China, Japan, Korea)	Oct 2016	Final Dec 2017; sunset renewed Jun 2022 — in force
India	Spandex (China, Vietnam, Korea) — original case	c. 2016	Duty imposed 2016 (~$3.34/kg); lapsed 2022, not renewed
India	PU leather (China)	Feb 2021	Final Feb 2022; duty $0–$0.46/m from May 2022 — in force to 2027
India	Polyether polyol (China, Thailand)	Mar 2023	Final Mar 2024; duty $534–$608/t — in force to 2029
India	TPU (China)	Sep 2023	Final Aug 2024; duty $0.93–$1.58/kg from Oct 2024 — in force to 2029
India	Spandex (China, Vietnam) — revived case	Mar 2025	Recommended Mar 2026, up to ~$2/kg — pending notification
United States	MDI (China)	Feb–Mar 2025	Final Apr 2026; AD order Jun 2026 — duty ~161.6%, in force
United States	PTMEG (China, Korea, Vietnam)	Apr 2026	ITC injury determination affirmative, May 2026, investigation continues; Commerce dumping-margin preliminary due Sep 16, 2026
European Union	Adipic acid (China)	Mar 2025	Provisional Nov 2025; definitive May 2026 — duty 29.1–42.3%, in force
European Union	Polyether polyol (China)	Jun 2026	Just opened — no determination yet
Brazil	Polyether polyol (China, US)	Jan 2024	Definitive Jul 2025 — duty $1,409–$1,469/t (China); public-interest review closed Feb 2026, duty upheld unchanged, in force to 2030
Brazil	Adipic acid (China) — sunset review	Mar 2026	Ongoing — review of existing duty

Read chronologically, the list itself makes the point of the section above concrete: a single early case in 2003 that ultimately lapsed in 2015 right as the current cycle was about to begin, then two more cases opened in the 2016–2021 window (India TDI, India PU leather), against nine opened from 2023 onward (India polyol, India TPU, India spandex revival, US MDI, US PTMEG, EU adipic acid, EU polyether polyols, Brazil polyol, Brazil adipic acid sunset review). The pace roughly quadrupled in the second half of the decade, and every case still open or still in force as of mid-2026 was filed in 2023 or later, with the sole exception of India’s TDI order, which has now survived one full sunset review and remains the longest-running currently active PU-specific measure against China in this list.

https://www.pudaily.com/news/65481/anti-dumping-on-polyurethane-how-trade-defense-is-repricing-chinas-pu-export-mod

June 25, 2026

China Bans HCFC-141b Use in Rigid Foams

HCFC-141b Ban Enters the Countdown: Is the PU Rigid Foam System About to Change?

June 15, 2026 6 min read

Viewing the Green Upgrade of Rigid Foam Through Blowing-Agent Substitution: Costs, Compliance and Order Thresholds

Core view: After July 1, the transition window for HCFC-141b in spray polyurethane foam products will close. The policy may not directly lift total demand for PU rigid foam, but it will reshape formulation systems, cost structures and order-entry thresholds for premixed polyols, spray rigid foam and downstream insulation projects.

As the July 1 deadline approaches, the PU rigid foam industry is reaching an important environmental-compliance watershed. According to Ministry of Ecology and Environment Announcement No. 28 of 2025, from January 1, 2026, the production of premixed polyols and polyurethane products using HCFC-141b as the blowing agent is prohibited, except for spray polyurethane foam products; from July 1, 2026, the production of spray polyurethane foam products using HCFC-141b as the blowing agent will also be prohibited.

This means premixed polyols and most polyurethane products have already entered the ban stage, while spray rigid foam is about to exit its final transition window. For the industry, this is not simply a matter of switching to another blowing agent; it is a system-wide adjustment affecting formulations, production, construction practices and customer compliance requirements.

1. Policy Deadline Nears: Spray Rigid Foam Enters Its Final Transition Window

In terms of policy timing, January 1, 2026 was the first threshold, mainly targeting premixed polyols and polyurethane products that use HCFC-141b as the blowing agent. In principle, premixed-polyol producers, rigid-foam product manufacturers and related polyurethane product companies other than spray foam can no longer continue using HCFC-141b as a blowing agent in production.

The July 1 deadline mainly targets spray polyurethane foam products. Unlike factory-made rigid-foam boards, pipe shells and other products, spray rigid foam is often formed on site. Its applications include building insulation, cold-storage insulation, fishing-vessel insulation, roof waterproofing and insulation, warehouse insulation and some pipeline insulation. Because construction participants are more dispersed, project scenarios are more complex and regulatory chains are longer, the policy previously granted a longer transition period.

Starting July 1, however, this transition window will also close. Spray polyurethane foam products using HCFC-141b as the blowing agent will then be banned from production. For spray-construction companies, premixed-polyol suppliers and downstream project customers, compliance requirements will shift from “gradual switching” to “mandatory switching.”

Figure 1: Key Timeline for the HCFC-141b Ban

2. The Impact Goes Beyond Blowing Agents: Rigid Foam Systems Will Re-segment

HCFC-141b has historically been widely used in PU rigid foam, mainly because of its foaming effect, thermal-insulation performance, process adaptability and cost advantages. However, a rigid-foam system usually consists of premixed polyols, isocyanates, blowing agents, catalysts, flame retardants and surfactants. Once the blowing agent changes, cell structure, thermal conductivity, dimensional stability, flame-retardant performance, construction window, spray adhesion and curing speed may all change accordingly.

Therefore, companies can hardly complete the upgrade by simply replacing HCFC-141b with another blowing agent. They need to readjust formulation systems and construction parameters. Current substitution routes available to the industry include water-blown systems, hydrocarbon blowing agents, HFCs and HFOs. These routes differ in environmental attributes, cost, equipment requirements, safety management and performance stability.

Water-blown systems and some hydrocarbon routes have relative cost advantages, but they place higher demands on formulations, equipment and on-site safety management. Low-GWP routes such as HFOs have stronger environmental attributes but higher costs, making them more suitable in the near term for customers with higher requirements for performance, certification and export compliance. Although HFCs are not ODS, they have already entered a longer-term greenhouse-gas control framework, so companies cannot evaluate substitution routes based only on immediate cost.

This also means the impact of the ban may not necessarily appear as a sudden increase in rigid-foam demand. It is more likely to show up as a re-segmentation of the market structure. Companies with formulation R&D capabilities, experience applying substitute blowing agents, testing capabilities and compliance-document management will be better positioned to take high-standard orders. Smaller companies that compete mainly on low prices and low compliance costs may face greater operating pressure.

Figure 2: Transmission Path of the HCFC-141b Ban Through the PU Rigid Foam Value Chain

From a cost perspective, substitute blowing agents, formulation validation, equipment adaptation, construction training and testing certification will all raise overall costs. However, this cost pressure may not be fully passed downstream. Demand for building insulation, cold-storage construction, insulated pipelines and some industrial insulation is still affected by real estate, infrastructure schedules, investment appetite and project-payment cycles, and end customers remain price-sensitive.

A more realistic judgment is therefore that the ban itself may not significantly expand total rigid-foam demand, but it will change order structure and profit distribution. Products that are highly compliant, high-performing and traceable may gain stronger bargaining power, while low-priced, opaque products that cannot prove the source of their blowing agents may gradually be excluded from key projects, branded customers and standardized construction scenarios. Environmental regulation will not create demand out of thin air, but it will raise the threshold for entering order systems.

3. Corporate Response Priorities: From Inventory Switching to a Closed Compliance Loop

Premixed-polyol companies are a critical link in this adjustment. Downstream foam companies and construction firms do not necessarily purchase single-component blowing agents directly; instead, they buy premixed-polyol systems that already contain the blowing agent. As a result, premixed-polyol companies are not only formulation providers but also key nodes in the chain of compliance responsibility.

After July 1, the room for HCFC-141b-containing systems to continue flowing into the spray-foam sector will basically close. Premixed-polyol companies need to focus on three issues: first, how to compliantly dispose of existing HCFC-141b-containing inventory; second, whether substitute blowing-agent systems can meet downstream construction and performance requirements; and third, whether contracts, labels, quality-inspection reports, blowing-agent declarations and customer filing materials can form a complete closed loop.

The spray-construction side also needs to upgrade in parallel. The special feature of spray PU rigid foam is on-site formation: construction environment, temperature and humidity, spray thickness, equipment pressure and operator practices all affect final quality. After blowing-agent substitution, construction companies need to become familiar with the operating window of the new system to avoid foam shrinkage, hollow spots, fluctuations in thermal performance, insufficient interlayer adhesion or higher on-site losses.

Figure 3: Response Checklist for Premixed-Polyol and Rigid-Foam Companies Before July 1

In the short term, companies should focus on three tasks: first, complete inventory checks as soon as possible, distinguishing standalone HCFC-141b, HCFC-141b-containing premixed polyols, orders in transit and project inventory; second, complete substitute-system validation and verify performance across scenarios such as cold storage, building insulation, fishing-vessel insulation and pipeline insulation; and third, improve compliance-document management by retaining procurement, sales, filing, test reports, blowing-agent declarations and contract clauses to reduce subsequent traceability risk.

Overall, the HCFC-141b ban entering the July 1 countdown marks a more thorough stage of blowing-agent substitution in the PU rigid foam industry. In the short term, it may bring higher costs, formulation adjustments and construction-adaptation pressure. In the long term, however, it will push the industry away from low-price competition and toward competition based on technology, compliance and service capabilities.

The PU rigid foam market may not expand rapidly because of one ban, but the rules of competition are changing. After July 1, rigid-foam companies will compete not only on price, but also on whether they can prove their products are more environmentally friendly, more stable and more compliant. This may be the deepest impact of the HCFC-141b ban on the polyurethane industry.

Sources: Ministry of Ecology and Environment Announcement No. 28 of 2025 and related policy Q&A; China Polyurethane Industry Association, Regulations on Ozone-Depleting Substances and Compliance Operations for Polyurethane Enterprises.

https://www.pudaily.com/news/65186/hcfc-141b-ban-enters-the-countdown-is-the-pu-rigid-foam-system-about-to-change

June 16, 2026

Chinese PO and Polyol Review

Explaining the Anomaly: Why Are Polyether Polyols Cheaper Than PO?

June 11, 2026 4 min read

Recently, the price inversion between propylene oxide (PO) and flexible slabstock polyols has drawn market attention.

Based on mainstream prices in Shandong, this round of inversion was not a one-day fluctuation. Since mid-May, the spread between flexible slabstock polyols and PO has gradually turned negative. On May 14, flexible slabstock polyols were CNY 250/tonne lower than PO. By May 29, the inversion widened to CNY 650/tonne, marking one of the deepest levels so far this year. Entering June, the inversion narrowed somewhat but had not fully repaired. On June 3, mainstream flexible slabstock polyols prices in Shandong stood at CNY 8,550/tonne, while PO was at CNY 8,900/tonne, leaving a negative spread of CNY 350/tonne.

Period	Flexible Slabstock Polyols	PO	Spread
Jan. avg.	8,296	8,108	188
Mar. avg.	11,311	10,510	801
Apr. avg.	12,443	11,841	601
May avg.	9,484	9,628	-143
Early Jun.	8,583	8,850	-267

Unit: CNY/tonne; spread = flexible slabstock polyols minus PO.

The charts show that flexible slabstock polyols maintained a positive spread over PO from January to April, with the spread once widening in March and April. However, after entering May, the spread quickly moved into negative territory. This suggests that the current inversion is not simply a pricing mismatch, but a reflection of diverging pricing power between upstream and downstream markets.

PO: More Concentrated Supply, Stronger Price Resilience

Compared with polyether polyols, the PO market has fewer producers and a higher degree of supply concentration. Producers also differ in process routes and cost structures. When margins are squeezed or losses deepen, some higher-cost producers tend to reduce operating rates, shut down units, or delay restarts to curb supply. Once supply tightens, PO prices can find support more easily.

Although PO prices fell sharply earlier, they later rebounded continuously. This indicates that PO pricing is not driven solely by weak demand, but is also affected by operating rates and producers’ willingness to defend prices.

Polyols: More Fragmented Capacity, Prices More Demand-Led

On the polyols side, new capacity has continued to come online in recent years, while market participants remain relatively fragmented. Different producers face different inventory, order, and sales pressures. When demand weakens, producers are more likely to offer concessions to move cargoes.

During June 1-5, domestic flexible slabstock polyols prices continued to bottom out. Bulk ex-works offers in North China were roughly CNY 8,300-8,700/tonne, down CNY 400-600/tonne from the previous week. Downstream sponge and home furnishing sectors were entering the off-season, purchases were mainly small-volume just-in-time orders, large orders were limited, and the sustainability of export demand still required attention. Against this backdrop, polyols prices lacked upward momentum.

Cost Structure: Pressure Is More Obvious for PO-Buying Producers

PO accounts for a high share of polyols production costs, usually around 80%. In theory, when PO prices remain high, polyols prices should move up accordingly; otherwise, margins will be compressed quickly.

However, polyols are not priced purely on a cost-plus basis. Final transaction prices are also determined by downstream acceptance, peer competition, and inventory pressure. Producers with integrated PO supply have a cost advantage and can tolerate lower polyols quotations, while non-integrated producers that buy PO externally face more rigid feedstock costs and greater pressure in a low-price competition environment.

Weaker Feedstocks Have Not Resolved the Inversion

It is worth noting that weaker propylene and liquid chlorine prices have not effectively repaired the inversion. In early June, Shandong propylene moved weakly, while liquid chlorine prices also softened. The cost side did not provide strong upward support for PO.

Even so, PO prices rebounded after earlier declines. This suggests that the current pricing driver is more about supply adjustment than pure cost movement. In other words, the inversion is not caused by PO costs being passively pushed higher; rather, PO is more sensitive to losses, while polyols simply lack the ability to rise.

Outlook: Repair Depends on Which Side Gives Way First

Looking ahead, there are three possible paths for the spread to repair. First, PO supply remains ample and prices continue to concede. Second, downstream replenishment supports a rebound in polyols prices. Third, polyols producers continue to absorb the inversion through margin compression.

In the short term, if demand does not show a clear improvement, the third scenario may remain the main path.

Therefore, this round of PO-polyols inversion is not merely a “cost inversion.” It is a redistribution of margins along the value chain during a weak demand cycle. The upstream side is defending prices through higher concentration and supply adjustment, while the downstream side is giving up margins amid loose capacity and insufficient orders. For polyols producers, the real pressure is not only that PO prices remain high, but that when PO still has support, polyols have already lost their ability to pass through costs.

https://www.pudaily.com/news/65127/explaining-the-anomaly-why-are-polyether-polyols-cheaper-than-po