History
February 9, 2023
Michel Baulé Tribute
Elastomer entrepreneur Michel Baulé passes away
With great sadness Covestro and its employees learned about the death of Michel Baulé, entrepreneur in the cast polyurethane industry, who has passed away January 13th at the age of 79.
“Our thoughts and condolences are with Michel’s family,” said Thomas Braig, Head of Elastomers at Covestro. “We will forever and fondly remember the entrepreneur, the exceptional man and our friend who was at the origin of Covestro Elastomers.”
Graduating with a PhD in chemistry, the native of Cavaillon, France embarked on entrepreneurship in 1976 at the age of 33 by creating a moulding company for cast polyurethane parts in Romans-sur-Isère, France. Fate, circumstances and his passion for innovation made him establish a second business in 1983, specialising in the formulation of cast elastomers systems. Together with companions such as Philippe Jeantin, currently Head of the Machines business at Covestro Elastomers, Antonio Alvarez and Mauro Modugno, he then founded yet another business in 1987, dedicated to the design and manufacture of low pressure dispensing machines.
These businesses became a leader in its realm as a co-operation. It later divested its molding entity to its executives to become EXSTO, while Baulé, combining the material formulation and the machines manufacturing, successfully established a Joint Venture with the MaterialScience division of the Bayer company in 2008. In 2012, this turned into a merger and Baulé’s former business became officially part of the Bayer group. In 2015, it became part of the carve out of Covestro from its parent company Bayer. Today, this business finds its heritage in the Elastomers Business Entity of Covestro, still headquartering in Romans-sur-Isère.
“We pay tribute to the genius that was Michel Baulé, for inspiring dozens of innovations in the cast polyurethane industry, among them the development of three-components systems with quasi-MDI-prepolymers and many innovative processing concepts that lead us to maintain and promote the brand Baulé® for our machine technology. He will be missed dearly,” Abdel Arhzaf, Managing Director of Covestro Elastomers SAS, added.
After a valuable contribution to the growth of the cast polyurethane industry, Michel Baulé developed a family office called EXIMIUM which has maintained all its entrepreneurial culture through acquisitions and participations while developing financial activities and support services. Until his last days he remained very active and energetic in his entrepreneurial role.
https://polymerspaintcolourjournal.com/news/elastomer-entrepreneur-michel-baul%C3%A9-passes-away
February 1, 2023
Tire Fill History
An Interview with Early Flatproofing Pioneer, Roger Cude
TAGS: Flatproofing, eliminate flat tires, #foamfill
Carlisle TyrFil recently sat down with Mr. Roger Cude, one of the founding principals of the TyrFil™ brand and an initial innovator in tire flatproofing technology, for a Q&A session to hear about the origins of the industry.
How did you start off in the tire fill industry?
My roots working in the tire fill, commonly referred to as foam fill, technology space go way back—six plus decades—to the very earliest days of the related industry field. I first met Ransome Wyman (a legendary figure in our industry, who went on to be one of the early distributors of tire fill) in 1959—he was a student instructor in my freshman college chemistry class. Ransome eventually went on to become the Lab Director for Chem Seal Corporation. When I went into engineering upon graduation, Wyman offered me a job. That company was involved in early polymer materials development.
I went on to join Pro-Seal Systems, which eventually became Teledyne, working in epoxy resins, as a chemist. I eventually followed Ransome into a new company that he had founded called Indpol (short for Industrial Polymers), which was a forerunner to what would eventually become one of the first developers of polyurethane foam fill technology. The solution was actually borne—almost accidentally, through troubleshooting other ad hoc fill technology solutions—out of the monothane (a single component heat cured urethane) rubber molding materials industry. Through a manual process that pumped polymer fill into a wheelbarrow tire, the earliest iteration of the flatproofing tire fill concept was created. Similar experiments were conducted on larger forklift tires, using a monothane compound to act as a “fill” constitution for tires on molten “slag” (disposed of junkyard refuse) removal vehicles. These foundational solutions formed the first tire flatproofing technologies.
Where did early tire fill technology go from there?
Ransome eventually moved on from Indpol. At that point, I had developed the technology to the point where it could potentially be sold for broader applications, but I moved on to another division of the company, called Grove Specialities, and went on to work in another capacity. Indpol continued to produce monothane and monopole solutions, but the tire flatproofing work, at that juncture, had basically halted. But I fortunately had carefully preserved the chemical formulations for the early work we’d been doing with monothane tire flatproofing.
A gentleman named Ed Gomberg was eventually brought in to run and revitalize an ailing Indpol. He saw that the organization was in trouble and was savvy enough to preserve the early flatproofing formulations that he stumbled upon—ultimately finding a way to build an alternate business model around the promising technology. Gomberg founded SynAir Corporation in Fontaine, CA for the specific purpose of developing and marketing tire flatproofing technology. Without Gomberg’s role in spotting real value in the technology, there would be no tire flatproofing industry as we know it today. And while Indpol eventually went belly up, this new entity was poised to grow the technology with a bright future.
How did the creation of Arnco Corporation fit in?
After the creation of the SynAir Corporation, Ransome Wyman saw the opportunities for flatproofing that were unfolding and wanted to get back into the market and get a piece of the foam fill distribution space. He and I teamed up at that point and formed the Arnco Corporation, basically which became an early competitor to SynAir. Arnco was founded in 1971 on my personal savings with a mere $1,800 down! While it was deeply undercapitalized, we believed in the technology and knew there was a vibrant marketplace for reliable tire flatproofing solutions. Our formulations were deeply rooted in fundamental chemistry. In fact, our Arnco company name was based directly on chemical symbolism—if you’re talking about a benzine ring in chemistry, the letters “AR” stands for aromatic. If you attach nitrogen, carbon and oxygen, you have polyurethane diisocyanate—the main raw materials we used to make our products.
There was a great deal of in-market competition in those early days—how did that impact that growth of flatproofing?
There was indeed a great deal of intra-industry competition. And sometimes, that competition is the very ingredient that can spur on innovation. SynAir started selling their flatproofing technology in 1971, and, at Arnco, we started selling ours in 1973. Initially, Arnco wasn’t producing tire fill technology—we were developing a fill for rubber industrial rollers, and it was only later that we adapted the solution fully for tire flatproofing purposes.
Back at that time, SynAir had generated an exclusive agreement with tire manufacturer BF Goodrich. I pulled the patents on their flatproofing solution—and it was based on the same solutions I had created and archived so many years prior. The time for this technology had cleary come. And at that time, Arnco began accruing relationships with tire manufacturers—not offering exclusive distribution deals but opening up the technology to a wide field of buyers. While SynAir technically held the patent, it only covered the process of filling the tire, not the formulation itself. While a series of legal conflagrations continued in court, Arnco marketed our version of the technology called PermaTire. We eventually added water into our urethane foam (water is the element that generates the “foam” in tire fill technology). This solution was essentially cheaper and more cost-effective than what was in SynAir’s technology, which we subsequently established under a separate patent. (In fact, this became the basis for what was known later as RePneu, now TyrFil Ultra)
What was the next phase of tire fill development?
Arnco and SynAir eventually put the legal disputes behind us. In 1989, Ransome Wyman departed the company, and I partnered up with a new team addition Larry Carapellotti, with whom I continued to grow the Arnco brand and offering. We were a small company of approximately 50 employees—and we all wore many hats.
Initially, in the early days, we were selling the tire fill compound by the pound, when it should have been sold by the gallon. It actually cost customers less to buy our compound, but the specific gravity of the material matters—and selling by volume rather than weight was more cost-efficient. Regardless, in the late 80’s, by the time the RePneu product had been patented, it represented a valuable compound. And, of course, the general tire fill formulation then became known as the branded TyrFil™ solution, which is widely sold today.
How did your tenure within the field culminate, and what became of TyrFil?
Having started Arnco in 1971, I decided to leave the industry in 2001 and sold the company to Larry Carapellotti. The company eventually merged with Pathway Polymers after being sold to umbrella chemical brand, Accella Performance Materials. That company, in 2017, was acquired by Carlisle Companies, which continues to market the industry-leading “foam fill” technology under the gold standard TyrFil brand. The flatproofing solutions that we pioneered in those early decades went on to represent a powerhouse technology that has been used and adopted globally by numerous vertical industries.
What do you personally see as your legacy in the industry, as it relates to the future of the market?
I’m proud of my work with the original formulations, and also later in assessing the dynamics of tire fill volume. I produced an adaptation of tire and rim standards and developed the original comprehensive weight charts that are still in use today. I also created a Weight Estimator that provides the mathematics that guides tire volume evaluations—assessing the interior of a tire on first an ellipsoidal, and then cylinder shape-based, formula that figures tire fill volume based on rim and tire dimensions. These guidelines continue as viable tools for the tire fill and flatproofing space.
The global tire fill market overall continues to flourish. Ever since Larry and I focused exclusively on flatproofing, the market has just grown exponentially and I’m very proud to be a part of the start of a phenomenal industry.
Mr. Cude is currently retired and resides in California.
carlisletyrfil.com/news/an-interview-with-early-flatproofing-pioneer-roder-cude/
December 15, 2022
Rocco L. Mascioli Obituary
Rocco L. Mascioli
December 8, 2022
Rocco L. Mascioli, 94, of Aston, PA died peacefully at home surrounded by his loving family on December 8, 2022. He is survived by Mary, his loving wife of 68 years. He will be deeply missed by his children Thomas (Gigi), Janice (Vincent), Madeleine (Michael), Christopher (Susan), Gregory (Linda), Carolyn (Neale) and Daniel; 19 grandchildren and four great-grandchildren. Devoted to his family and his faith, he was humble, patient, giving and generous.
Born in Mount Carmel, PA, Rocco was the eldest child of Lawrence and Angelina Mascioli. He was the Valedictorian of the Frackville, PA High School class of 1946 and served in the Army for two years before graduating from Bucknell University in 1952. He received his PhD in Chemistry from the University of Pennsylvania in 1957.
Rocco was employed first with Houdry Process Corporation, then with Air Products and Chemicals Incorporated before retiring from Arco Chemicals. As Director of Applied Research, he received numerous patents and was responsible for the development of aircraft deicers.
He volunteered for several civic associations, was a leader in local politics and was very involved in Saint Joseph’s Church serving most recently as a lector and Eucharistic Minister.
Mass of Christian burial will be Tuesday, December 13, 2022 10:00 AM at the Church of St. Joseph, 3235 Concord Road, Aston where friends and relatives may gather 8:45 AM till 9:45 AM. Interment is at Saints Peter and Paul Cemetary. In lieu of flowers, memorial donations may be sent to the Church of St. Joseph of Aston.
To plant Memorial Trees in memory of Rocco L. Mascioli, please click here to visit our Sympathy Store.
May 20, 2022
Giant Container Ship History
Giant container ships are ruining everything
We can blame the Big Boat Era for many of our supply chain headaches
Rachel PremackThursday, May 19, 2022 7 minutes read
Listen to this article 0:00 / 10:53 BeyondWords
I hate big boats, and so should you.
In 2006, Maersk stunned the global shipping community with the introduction of Emma Maersk, a container ship that could carry nearly 15,000 twenty-foot equivalent units. (TEUs translate to about half of a standard forty-foot shipping container.)
Emma Maersk set off an “arms race” with its introduction. Ocean carriers ordered bigger and bigger ships, believing that they could reach economies of scale if they could jam all their shipments into one big boat instead of a few small ones.
Today, we’ve appeared to reach peak Big Boat Era. The Emma Maersk is now wimpy next to 2022’s true megaships. The largest container ships to be delivered this year have a maximum capacity of 24,000 TEUs. (This class of ship is named — I am not making this up — the “Ever Alot.” The Evergreen shipping company, the very same that blocked the Suez Canal last year, ordered the record-breaking ship.)
Each year brings a new, larger-than-ever megaship. The largest ship class of a given year has increased by 50% from 2012 to today, or nearly sixfold from 1981 to today.
Massive container ships have helped wreak serious chaos on global trade. I spoke with four experts this week to learn how megaships are the sneaky reason for much of our ongoing shipping crisis.
Here are the three reasons I hate big boats:
1. They underpin the global shipping oligopoly.
Global shipping is dominated by a few giant firms. But it wasn’t always this way.
In the 1970s, there were so many ocean carriers that no single company controlled the industry. Since then, the market has consolidated into just a few large firms.
Up to 60 of the 100 largest ocean carriers have vanished from the 2000s to today, thanks to a wave of bankruptcies and acquisitions. The top 10 largest ocean carriers in 2000 commanded 51% of the market; today, they dominate 80% of it, according to a White House fact sheet. All of these companies are based outside the U.S.
Smaller ocean carriers began forming alliances with each other in order to compete with larger carriers, said Campbell University professor Sal Mercogliano. Megashippers decided to copy the strategy. Today, the largest ocean carriers are organized into three major container shipping alliances: 2M, The Alliance and Ocean Alliance.
To ship something from, say, China to Los Angeles, you book space on a container ship operated by one of these alliances. Each company shares space on the container ship with other members of the alliance. But these alliances may cancel — or have “blank sailings” — if demand has slumped.
This system has been great for the carriers’ own financial performance. Some claim this consolidation and the alliance system lead to inflated rates.
The Loadstar, a global logistics publication, reported on April 22 that the 2M alliance was blanking at least three Asia-North Europe sailings. New Chinese COVID lockdowns were one reason for the cancellation, but Loadstar also pointed to 2M’s desire to “halt the slide in rates” amid a slump in volume from China. More canceled sailings mean less capacity for cargo, and likely higher rates.
Container ships have been steadily increasing in size since they were created in 1956. But it wasn’t until the 2000s that the Big Boat Era truly began, Mercogliano said. Ocean carriers believed they could reach economies of scale if they built giant ships. The idea was to put all of your cargo on one massive ship instead of two or three smaller ones.
Such megaships were expensive. Emma Maersk, for example, cost an estimated $145 million. But banks were happy to provide the cash, said Capt. John Konrad, CEO of maritime website gCaptain.
Konrad told FreightWaves that ocean carriers are ideal lending targets. If an ocean carrier defaults on its loan, you can simply repossess any of its ships. And, conveniently, many receive hefty subsidies or other support from the governments of the countries they’re based in. Before the financial crisis, banks were happy to provide massive loans to ocean liners to build the megaships of their dreams.
Then 2008 happened. As Mercogliano said, “The freight dried up.”
Big ocean liners were stuck with massive ships and not much to put on them. Many went bankrupt, and the ones that remained formed alliances.
“Firms started to say, ‘Well, these ships are tremendous investments and there’s too much money on the line,’” said University of Vermont professor Richard Sicotte. “‘Let’s share the capacity among different companies, who would ostensibly be our rivals.’”
Through the 2010s, consolidation accelerated. Eight large carriers, including No. 6 largest ocean carrier Hanjin, either went bankrupt or were acquired by other large firms.
The ‘cartel’ no one noticed?
Crucially, this lack of competition didn’t bother anyone through the 2010s, when ocean rates were absurdly low and carriers were barely turning a profit (if at all). Alliances and consolidation were the only way to make the economics work. Bizarrely, companies continued to build even larger megaships, still chasing those economies of scale while sinking them further into debt.
“Because so few of them were left, they formed these alliances to stop underbidding each other,” Mercogliano said. “The U.S., EU, China, everyone signed off on the idea that these are not cartels. They are not trusts. The reason we did it is because we all benefited from it: We love cheap freight. It cost nothing to move goods across the Pacific.”
That all changed in 2021, when carriers were raking in cash.
The Biden administration called these shipping companies a “cartel.” Some importers have recently claimed that ocean carriers have price gouged them and failed to fill their contracts amid sky-high ocean rates. On the other hand, FreightWaves’ own Greg Miller recently argued that competition among ocean liners increased as rates spiked.
Whether or not these carriers are price fixing is hardly something we can settle in today’s newsletter, but what we can agree on is that this consolidation — driven by the inability of individual companies to fill their own megaships — probably wouldn’t be so stark without those big darn ships.
2. They cause port congestion.
The more obvious reason that big ships are helping cause our ongoing supply chain chaos is that they’re literally too big to fit into most ports. Even the Suez Canal struggled to accommodate one of these megaships, causing the crucial global conduit to be clogged for days last year.
Matt Stoller, who is the director of research at the American Economic Liberties Project, told FreightWaves these megaships are great for moving lots of cargo across oceans. The problem is once you get to your destination. Ocean carriers (and the financial institutions that bankroll them) aren’t paying for updated ports, increased dredging, new warehouses, highways and so on to accommodate these ships. That cost is getting off-loaded to the public, Stoller said.
Indeed, as Mercogliano pointed out, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey spent a whopping $1.7 billion to raise its Bayonne Bridge to accommodate the shipping scions’ new megaships — a cost that was paid by taxpayers, not ocean carriers or shippers.
One complex is remarkably adept at accommodating those ships: the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles. As a result, it claims 40% of all U.S. seaborne imports. Before the U.S. saw historic imports in 2020 and onward, this system worked well enough. But over the past year, it’s been remarkably backed up, causing unprecedented supply chain crunches as importers struggled to offload their containers and load empty ones back on to make the trip back to Asia.
If these ships were not so giant, we likely wouldn’t see this kind of congestion. Ocean carriers could bring their normal-sized ships to other ports around the U.S. Stoller pushed for more competition among ocean carriers, which would perhaps mean more diverse types of ships.
“We have a lot of ports in this country but we don’t have enough ocean carrier firms,” Stoller said. “The ocean carrier firms’ boats are too big for most ports.”
3. They’re quietly the reason for the ocean carriers’ financial struggles.
By engaging in the megaships “arms race,” ocean carriers really just played themselves.
One 2016 study by business advisory firm AlixPartners pointed out “the irony of megaships.” In 2016 and 2017, global ocean carrier capacity increased by 4.5% and 5.6%, respectively. But demand only upticked by 1% to 3% those years. The panic to build bigger and bigger ships resulted in depressed rates:
Ironically, says the study, the resulting overcapacity — and corresponding negative effect on profits — is in part the result of the industry’s drive in recent years to correct its chronic supply-and-demand imbalance by building these more efficient but mammoth ships.
Months after that report, the No. 6 largest container shipping company went bankrupt. Hanjin, which had ordered more and more megaships before its insolvency, was in $10.5 billion of debt.
By continually flooding the market with capacity, ocean carriers drove down their own shipping rates. That left them with crushing debt and no way to pay it back. COVID and the influx of trade helped many carriers pay off their massive liabilities, but the good times will eventually run out for these companies.
Praise be! The megaship’s choke hold on our oceans appears to be loosening.
Brilliantly, ocean carriers seem to be reading my mind and hastening the end of the Big Boat Era. Of the thousands of container ships in the pipeline for these next few years, the biggest category is ships ranging from 3,000 to 7,999 TEUs, according to a recent report from Clarkson Research.
As for deliveries scheduled or already made from this year to 2025, 53 are ships with a capacity of 17,000 TEUs or larger, compared to 230 ships with a capacity of 12,000 to 16,999 TEUs.
Perhaps I shouldn’t speak so soon. One 2016 article in the Financial Times, covering a Drewry Shipping Consultants study, claimed that if ships reached 24,000 TEUs, the costs of running such a ship would overtake the profit made from being able to hold so many containers. That would mean losses for the ocean carrier.
And yet, dear reader, shipping magnates have gone ahead with the 24,000-TEU ships: At least a dozen may be sailing as you read this. (Or perhaps, they’re waiting outside of the Port of Long Beach to be unloaded.)
Do you have anything to share about containerized ocean shipping? Email the reporter at rpremack@freightwaves.com, and be sure to subscribe to MODES for your weekly supply chain updates.
November 20, 2021
Origins of the Container
Less than three minutes of shipping history! Enjoy
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